COMMENTS
THE COLLATERAL-ESTOPPEL EFFECT TO BE GIVEN
STATE-COURT JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL SECTION
1983 DAMAGE SUITS
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' litigants have a federal forum 2 in
which to seek redress for state deprivations of federal constitutional
rights.8 One such genre of claims involves suits by state criminal
defendants seeking damages for constitutional torts suffered at the
hands of state police or prosecutorial officials. 4 The constitutional
issue underlying the federal damage claim often has been decided
against the litigant in the course of his state criminal trial or
ancillary suppression hearing." Most federal courts have held the
section 1983 plaintiff barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel
from relitigating the constitutional issue-or any underlying factthus effectively denying any relief under section 1983.6
1 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
This section was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
2 Original jurisdiction over § 1983 claims is conferred on the lower federal courts
by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). Federal jurisdiction, however, is not exclusive.
See note 47 infra.
3
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 172-87 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HA~v. L. REv. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Section 1983 Developments].
4
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was the first case
to allow suits of this type.
5
See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Bicci, 498 F.2d 1257 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 909 (1975); Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
6 To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue to what extent collateral estoppel applies in these cases. See Vestal, State Court Judgment as
Preclusive in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OXEA. L. BEv. 185,
191-92, 195-97 (1974); Comment, Res Judicata and Section 1983: The Effect of
State Court Judgments on Federal Civil Rights Actions, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177,
180 & n.10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.C.L.A. Comment].
A majority of circuits having considered the issue apparently would estop a
state criminal defendant from relitigating his constitutional claim in a section 1983
proceeding. See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1978); Martin
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The Eighth Circuit, however, recently ruled that collateral
7
estoppel will not universally preclude relief in section 1983 cases.
In McCurry v. Allen,8 Willie McCurry filed a section 1983 action
in federal district court seeking damages from several police officers
who allegedly violated his constitutional rights, including his
fourth-amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
The alleged violations occurred during McCurry's arrest and the
ensuing search of his home. McCurry had unsuccessfully litigated the fourth-amendment issue in the course of a pretrial suppression hearing and before the intermediate state appellate court 9
v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Fimmer v.
Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977); Mastracchio v.
Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975);
Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339, 341-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.
1970).
The Third Circuit purports to be in agreement with this view, see Kauffman v.
Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970), but the
opinion labeled the "opinion of the court," id. 1271, is joined by only one judgethe second judge dissented in relevant part, id. 1277, and the third judge concurred only "in the result." Id. Further, one district court in the Third Circuit
has reached the opposite result. See Clark v. Lutcher, 426 F. Supp. 1266 (M.D.
Pa. 1977).
A proposed amendment to § 1983, the Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1979,
S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S15,994 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as S. 19833, would accord prior state judgments only res-judicata,
not collateral-estoppel, effect. Id. § 2. Further, the prior judgment would be
binding only if that action had been initiated by the federal plaintiff. Id. See
125 CONG. REc. S15,992 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Mathias) [hereinafter cited as Mathias]. See generally id. S15,992-94; Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 35 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (hearings on a
similar bill that died in committee).
S. 1983 would substantively change much current civil-rights case law. See,
e.g., notes 59, 77, 90 & 194 infra.
7
Although the issue is far from clear, two other circuits apparently would also
not grant collateral-estoppel effect to the prior state-court adjudication. See, e.g.,
Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285,
1288 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum).
8466 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
9 See State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), aff'g No.
77-862 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1978), application for transfer (appeal) denied, No. 62015
(Mo. Sup. Ct. May 1, 1980).
McCurry's fourth-amendment challenge stemmed from the search for and
seizure of heroin that was subsequently used to secure his conviction for possession
of a controlled substance. The seizure came about after an abortive undercover
operation; several undercover agents visited McCurry at his home and attempted
to make a heroin purchase. Rather than deal, McCurry shot at them, wounding
two agents seriously. During the course of a search of McCurry's house following
his surrender, the police found and seized the heroin. The Missouri Circuit Court
and Court of Appeals justified part of the search under the plain-view doctrine,
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See McCurry v. Allen, 587 S.W.2d
at 340-41.
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prior to seeking federal relief. The federal district court, in turn,
granted the defendant-policemen's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the full litigation of the search-and-seizure issue
in the state courts collaterally estopped McCurry from using section 1983 to relitigate in federal court the constitutionality of the
search.1 0 It was this ruling that McCurry appealed to the Eighth
Circuit.
The court of appeals agreed with McCurry. Although the
court refused to decide the general question whether, in the context of section 1983 litigation, an estoppel should bar the relitigation of any constitutional issue decided against the plaintiff in the
course of a prior state criminal trial,1 it did hold that no estoppel
would apply to bar fourth-amendment claims.' 2 The unavailability of habeas-corpus relief for fourth-amendment violations was

the determinative consideration;

'1

in the court's mind, the strong

section 1983 policy of providing a federal forum for constitutional
claims, combined with the recent removal of habeas as such a
forum, outweighed any reasons for granting an estoppel. 14 Thus,
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that McCurry should be accorded
access to a federal court to litigate his federal claims at least once;
because habeas relief was not available to him, McCurry was permitted to seek relief under section 1983.
The Eighth Circuit's holding in McCurry was motivated by
considerations transcending technical aspects of collateral estoppel;
the reasoning relies heavily on unresolved questions of state- and
federal-court relations. This Comment will analyze the McCurry
result from the standpoint of federalism. First, the Comment will
examine the premise that the federal courts have an obligation,
embodied in section 1983, to hear federal constitutional claims,
even should relitigation of findings previously made in the course
of a state criminal proceeding be required. Second, the Comment
explores the issue whether the availability of habeas relief ab10 McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. at 515-16.
:1 McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d at 798.
121d. 798-99.
IsThe lack of habeas relief for state convictions based on evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment is a relatively new development in constitutional
law. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court put an abrupt
end, in most cases, to the practice sanctioned at least since Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), of entertaining such requests for habeas. Thus, a
grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976), remains as
the only route for federal review of this type of fourth-amendment claim.
14 McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d at 799.
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solves federal courts of this obligation, 5 and, if not, what other
impact the availability or unavailability of habeas might have.
Finally, the Comment will consider whether fourth-amendment
claims merit a more lenient application of the collateral-estoppel
doctrine. 16
The Comment concludes that section 1983 does indeed embody
a "federal-forum policy" that requires the federal courts to permit
relitigation, unburdened by collateral estoppel, of issues previously
litigated in some cases when a state criminal defendant seeks damages to compensate for the unconstitutional conduct of state lawenforcement officials. Further, the availability of federal habeascorpus relief should play no role in determining whether relief
under section 1983 is eventually available; habeas does, however,
impose constraints on the timing of section 1983 relief. The
criterion that determines whether collateral estoppel should bar
such suits is instead the ability of society to tolerate inconsistent
adjudications of constitutional issues arising from official misconduct. Application of this test to the fourth-amendment issues of
McCurry compels the conclusion that collateral estoppel should
not bar the relitigation of the plaintiff's claims in any section 1983
action based on the fourth amendment.,
15For cases suggesting that habeas may make a difference, see Rimmer v.
Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Evans,
550 F.2d 345, 345-46 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Ford v. Byrd, 544 F.2d 194, 195 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1976); Brazzelli v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F.
Supp. 86, 88-89 (E.D. Va. 1973).
16 See generally Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions after State Court Judgment, 44 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 191 (1972); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judieial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, (pt. 2), 60 VA. L.
REv. 250 (1974); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to
the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. 1Ev. 859 (1976); Vestal, Res Judicata and Section
1983: The Effect of State Court Judgments on Federal Civil Rights Actions, 65
IowA L. REv. 281 (1980); Vestal, supra note 6; Section 1983 Developments, supra
note 3, at 1330-60; UCLA Comment, supra note 6; Note, The Collateral Estoppel
Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
95 [hereinafter cited as ILL. Note].
1' It is important at the outset to note the narrow approach of this Comment.
The Comment does not discuss the use of § 1983 as a vehicle for mounting a collateral attack on any state civil, see, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975), or criminal, see, e.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138
(7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1980)
(No. 79-1679), judgment. Such attempts are properly precluded on either jurisdictional, see, e.g., id., or res-judicata, see, e.g., Diaz-Buxo v. Trias Monge, 593 F.2d
153 (1st Cir. 1979), grounds.
In contrast, in the factual scenario examined in this Comment, the state-court
judgment is not directly attacked. Compare Waste Management, Inc. v. Fokakis,
614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1980) (No. 79-1679) (defendant-corporation convicted and fined in a
state criminal proceeding attempted to use § 1983 as a means of directly attacking
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INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Before considering the federalism issues that are the primary
focus of this Comment, a summary of the technical aspects of collateral estoppel is necessary to demonstrate that, other considerations aside, McCurry would be estopped from relitigating the
8
adverse determination of his fourth-amendment claim.'

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, makes
the prior determination of an issue binding on a party or his privy
in a subsequent proceeding. 19 Four conditions must be satisfied
in order to estop the relitigation of a previously decided issue.
First, there must be substantial identity of issues; the issue sought
to be relitigated must be essentially the same as the issue litigated
in the previous action.20 Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action. 21 Third, there must have
conviction in federal court) with Brnbaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974)
(§ 1983 plaintiff sought damages for arrest without probable cause after state magistrate had found probable cause and state criminal proceeding then had been dismissed on state's motion).
18 This Comment shall subsequently demonstrate, however, that collateral estoppel is not an inflexible doctrine. Once the key "other consideration"--federalism
policies-is added to the equation, the conclusion is reached that collateral estoppel
should be no inherent bar to § 1983 damage suits arising out of a state criminal
proceeding no matter what the constitutional violation being claimed. This conclusion, however, is only a beginning; succeeding observations suggest a narrowing
of the relief available.
'9 See generally, F. JAMms & G. HAZARu, CivM PocDURiE §§ 11.16-.31 (2d
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as F. JAmEs]; lB J. MooRE & T. Cunrm, Moone's
FkmmuL PRACTCE fIff 0.441-.448 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1979-80) [hereinafter cited
as J. MooREI; REsTATEmmT (SEco"rD) OF JUDGmETS, topic 2, §§ 68, 68.1 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEmEN ]; Currie, Res JudicataThe Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317 (1978); Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata,65 Hanv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
20
E.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155-58 (1979); Scooper
Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974); J. MoorE,
supra note 19, at ff 0.443[2; RESTATEmmNT, supra note 19, at § 68, Comment c.
Lower federal courts considering § 1983 claims have often required an "identity" of issues, a requirement that sometimes appears to be a subterfuge for considering meritorious claims that might otherwise be barred by collateral esoppel.
See, e.g., Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974) (issue of constitutionality of police conduct not identical to issue of good-faith belief in existence of
probable cause); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1972) (issue
of existence of probable cause for arrest not identical to issue of excessiveness of
force employed in effecting arrest). The Brubaker distinction is incorrect, see
McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 798 n.10 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 1012 (1980), because a finding that the police conduct in question is constitutional comprises a complete defense to a § 1983 claim. The Williams distinction is sounder, as an excessively violent arrest may be justified by probable cause
and yet still be "unreasonable" under the fourth amendment.
21
E.g., Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 856 (1st Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Oicial Reps. & Employees of the L.A. Police Dep't, 487 F.2d 885, 886 (9th
Cir. 1973); F. JA_ ms, supra note 19, at § 11.17; J. MooRE, supra note 19, at
0.443[3]; RESTATmmNT, supra note 19, at § 68, Comments d & e; Vestal, supra
note 6, at 208-09. But see Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (1970)
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been a determination in the first action precisely on this issue.22
Finally, this determination must have been necessary to the judg23
ment in the earlier action.
Collateral estoppel should be distinguished from its parent
doctrine-res judicata. 24 Although both doctrines serve many of
the same societal interests,s the scope of collateral estoppel is different from that of res judicata. Res judicata totally bars the relitigation of whole causes of actions; the effect of collateral estoppel
is limited to individual facts 26 or issues.2 7 Ironically, the scope
of collateral estoppel is both broader and narrower than that of its
parent doctrine. Collateral estoppel sweeps further than res judicata in that its application is not restricted to later suits between
the same parties and their privies; only the party against whom
the doctrine is invoked must have been present or represented
in the prior action.2 8 At the same time, the effect of res judicata
(collateral estoppel by guilty plea); Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 937
(N.D. I1I. 1969) (collateral estoppel barred § 1983 claim despite fact that constitutional question was never litigated at tral----"[u]nder these circumstances, his
failure to contest the issue can reasonably be regarded as an admission....").
22
E.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Fernandez v.
Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 857 (1st Cir. 1978); F. JAMES, supra note 19, at
§ 11.18.
23 E.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Winters v. Lavine,
574 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 558 (5th
Cir.) (quoting Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 511 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959)) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); F. JM1rs, supra
note 19, at § 11.19; J. Moone, supra note 19, at ff 0.443[5; RESTAT ENvT, supra
note 19, at § 68, Comment h.
24
See J. Moonz, supra note 19, at f[110.405[3] & 0.44111]. See generally F.
JAmms, supra note 19, at §§ 11.3-.15.
2For example, both collateral estoppel and res judicata encourage efficient use
of judicial resources, enhance predictability and consistency, and foster respect for
determinations of the original tribunal. See F. Jvms, supra note 19, at § 11.2; ILL.
Note, supra note 16, at 96.
26A distinction is sometimes drawn between issues of fact or mixed law/fact,
and issues of law. Collateral-estoppel effect can be accorded only to questions of
pure fact or mixed law/fact. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 336 (1957).
Determinations of law have primarily precedential value. See J. Moomn, supra note
19, at 10.442[1]. But see F. JAms, supra note 19, at § 11.20 (collateral estoppel
once had only precedential value, but modem trend is to apply issue preclusion
to legal issues, subject to special qualifications).
27
See J. MooBE, supra note 19, at 110.405[1]. Thus, denying collateralestoppel effect to a prior factual determination does not threaten a judgment to the
same extent as the relitigation of an entire claim.
28 This has not always been the case. Until recently, the doctrine of mutuality
limited the application of collateral estoppel. See Comment, Collateral Estoppel:
The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L. 1EBv. 521 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mo. Comment]. The mutuality doctrine prevented any party from
benefiting from an estoppel unless he could also be burdened by it. J. MoonE,
supra note 19, at f[ 0.412[1]. Because due process required that an individual not
party or privy to a prior action could never be burdened by an estoppel arising
therefrom, see, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); Mo. Corn-
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is more extensive than that of collateral estoppel 29 in that the
former doctrine may be applied to bar causes of action that could
have been, but were not, litigated in the prior action; 30 the four
prerequisites for the application of collateral estoppel are not
apposite.31
These distinctions make clear that collateral estoppel, and not
res judicata, is the correct doctrine to apply to section 1983 damage
claims based on issues previously litigated in state criminal proceedings. The basic requirements of res judicata are not met in
such cases. First, the parties in the section 1983 suit are not the
same as the parties in the state criminal action. For example,
McCurry, of course, was present in both proceedings, but his adversary in each action was different.32 Second, the civil cause of
action is quite different from the criminal one, thus independently
defeating the use of res judicata. 33
ment, supra, at 524, the mutuality doctrine effectively limited the scope of collateral estoppel to situations where the parties in the second action were either opposing parties, or in privity with the opposing parties, in the former action.
Most state and federal courts, however, have relaxed the mutuality requirement,
at least where the nonparty is using the estoppel defensively in the later suit.
See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 328-30 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); Mo. Comment, supra, at 526-27. Although at least one commentator has
suggested that a McCurry-type suit might be an appropriate context in which to
revive the mutuality requirement, see McCormack, supra note 16, at 289-90, the
federal courts have not agreed. See, e.g., Mastraccio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257,
1260 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975).
29The narrowness of the scope of collateral estoppel exists because too broad
an application may yield "unforeseeable and sometimes unjust results." J. MooPE,
-supranote 19, at ff 0.441[2].
30
See Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 418 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.
1969); REsTATEmENT, supra note 19, at §§ 61-61.1 (Tent Draft No. 1, 1973).
But see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
31 See notes 20-23 supra & accompanying text.
32
The police officers were, at most, only witnesses in the criminal proceeding.
It could be argued, however, that, because the state is significantly involved in
prosecuting the case, the requirements of privity are met. See Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 & n.5 (1979); J. MooPx, supra note 19, at II0.411[6].
Although this argument, if accepted, meets the identity-of-parties requirement, the
second deficiency-a lack of identity between causes of action-would still defeat
any attempt to apply res judicata. See note 33 infra & accompanying text.
33 Modern thinking defines a cause of action in terms of a given transaction or
operative set of facts without regard to the legal theory under which suit is brought
or to the remedy requested. See New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d
764, 774 n.53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); RESTATEmzNT, supra
note 19, at § 61, Comment a. A § 1983 suit is a different action than the claim
litigated in a suppression hearing, for example, because the damage relief available
in the § 1983 suit is not available in a criminal proceeding. Further, courts still adhere to the principle that civil and criminal proceedings by their very nature involve
different causes of action. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 856
n.11 (1st Cir. 1978); J. MoonE, supra note 19, at 7O.418[11].
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On the other hand, in a case such as McCurry, in which an
issue crucial 3 to the section 1983 constitutional claim was raised
and defeated in the course of a criminal trial, the technical requirements of collateral estoppel generally are met. First, the substantialidentity-of-issues requirement is met in McCurry-the lack of probable cause, the issue decided against McCurry in the suppression
hearing, was the basis of his section 1983 suit.3 5 Second, the constitutionality of the search and seizure was both fully litigated and
decided 36 for estoppel purposes. Finally, because the heroin
McCurry attempted to suppress was the only evidence offered
against him by the state to prove possession, the finding of probable
37
cause was evidently necessary to the judgment.
84
Crucial issues are of a different form depending on the nature and context
of the constitutional claim. A fourth-amendment question, for example, is litigated
in a suppression hearing ancillary to the regular trial. The claim asserted in the
suppression hearing is that the search or arrest was without probable cause.
The issue estopped here thus would be the specific finding of probable cause.
The federal determination whether to estop relitigation of that issue would require
a detailed examination of the state record to determine the extent of consideration.
See, e.g., Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
This is a somewhat uncertain undertaking, however, as it is
U.S. 846 (1970).
usually difficult to determine what evidentiary facts were necessary to the prior
determination given the normally informal nature of the earlier proceeding. See
note 23 supra & accompanying text.
A second type of constitutional question involves the determination of the
voluntariness of a confession. This issue is normally resolved at a special hearing
prior to trial. If the court rules that the confession is not involuntary as a matter
of law, the defendant still may argue voluntariness to the jury. An allegation of
perjury by a state official is a similar recurring theme. Here, most commonly, no
constitutional claim would be raised at trial. Instead, the jury must itself judge
the credibility of each witness.
When courts employ collateral estoppel to block litigation in both these situations, the theory is that the jury must have believed that the confession was voluntary or that the witness was reliable in order to arrive at its guilty verdict. See
note 23 supra & accompanying text. This assumption is somewhat dubious because
it is difficult to determine why juries decide cases as they do. See United States v.
Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1095 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 1999
(1980).
35 This need not always be the case, however. See note 20 supra.

36 See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
arThis matter may not always be so clear, depending on exactly what is
considered to be the "judgment." If the judgment is the finding of probable cause
in the suppression hearing, for example, then the constitutional issue and the
judgment are identical and, as a matter of logic, the determination of the constitutional issue was necessary to reach the judgment. Even so, this scenario should
not always lead to federal court application of collateral-estoppel doctrine. Should
a defendant lose on the issue of probable cause in a suppression hearing, but be
found not guilty at trial, he should not be collaterally estopped from contesting
the constitutionality of the police conduct in a § 1983 suit, because he cannot
appeal the suppression hearing finding. See Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072,
1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Jones v. Saunders, 422 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) ).
If, on the other hand, the judgment is considered to be the guilty verdict, it
is often difficult to know exactly what issues the trier of fact found necessary,
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Thus, the technical requirements of collateral estoppel appear
to be satisfied and a section 1983 plaintiff in a position similar to
McCurry's would be precluded from relitigating his claim. But
these technical requirements do not operate in a vacuum; the doctrine of issue preclusion is somewhat flexible 3s depending on the
degree to which policy considerations transcending those of finality
are implicated, and, sub silentio, the apparent merit of the claim or
defense sought to be estopped. Federal courts have relied on this
flexibility extensively to rescue potentially meritorious section 1983
claims from the effects of issue preclusion.3 9 On the other hand,
when presented with a clearly unmeritorious claim, 40 these same
courts have either avoided hypertechnical application of the doctrine's criteria, or excused them altogether, 41 in order to grant
preclusive effect to state determinations.
An analysis of both sets of cases reveals that the technical requirements for the use of collateral estoppel are often overshadowed
by other concerns, especially federalism considerations. 42 Such an
absent specific findings. See, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339, 342
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974). This problem is especially likely
to arise in § 1983 suits involving claims such as perjury by state officials. See
note 34 supTa.
38 See generally J. MoosE, supra note 19, at iiir 0.405[12], 0.441[2].
39 Federal courts have relied on a number of technical arguments to avoid
dismissing such claims including the nonidentity of issues, see note 20 supra, the
differing preclusive effect of law versus fact, see note 26 supra, the nonessentialness
of the issue to the final judgment, see, e.g., Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325,
327-28 (7th Cir. 1972), and the lack of a possibility of appeal, see, e.g., Wilkinson
v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1087-88 (E.D. Pa. 1980); cf. F. JAMms, supra note 19,
at § 11.20 (estoppel not applied to legal issues if prior case not fully appealed).
40
See, e.g., Nash v. Reedel, 86 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1980), appeal dismissed
as frivolous, No. 80-1331 (3d Cir. May 22, 1980) (petition for rehearing pending).
See also note 34 supra. In Nash, a convicted two-time rapist brought a § 1983
action against his victims for alleged perjury, and against the local police for,
inter alia, knowing use of the allegedly perjured testimony of the victims.
Following an examination of the state trial record, Judge Luongo held the rapist
estopped from litigating the truth of the testimony, concluding that the state judge
must have found the testimony true in order to convict.
41
See Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970), in
which the court held that a guilty plea precluded litigation under § 1983 of a
fourth-amendment search-and-seizure issue which, had it been litigated successfully,
would have resulted in the suppression of crucial evidence. Not all federal judges
are comfortable with this result. See, e.g., Meadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d 345, 345
(5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part from en bane, per curiam opinion),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d at
318-19 (Holloway, J., concurring in the result).
42Some courts admit as much. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848, 856 n.11 (1st Cir. 1978) ("Especially when federalism interests are involved,
modem analysis has tended away from the technicalities in favor of analysis of the
purposes of issue and claim preclusion." (citing Currie, supra note 20, at 341-42));
Meadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d 345, 345 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part
from en bane, per curiam opinion) ("[Tlhe rigors that are conditions precedent to
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ad hoc application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not
satisfactory; some articulation of the considerations that lie behind
these differing results is the next task of this Comment.
II.

FEDERALISM

AND

THE APPLICATION

OF

COLLATERAL

ESTOPPEL IN SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

That a plaintiff in McCurry's position is questioning a state
determination in federal court necessarily raises the issue of federalstate relations. But there are federalism considerations that argue
both for and against according collateral-estoppel effect in a
43
McCurry-type suit.
A. Section 1738
Those tending to support estoppel mirror the policies discussed above. 44 For example, the Full Faith and Credit Act
("Section 1738") 45 is a statutory embodiment of the policy that due
46
deference is owed to the prior determinations of a state court.
A broad reading of section 1738 would preclude relitigation of any
issue decided in state court if the state's own courts would themselves bar relitigation. 7 It would, however, be unwise to construe
the statute so broadly. It was not at all foreseeable to its draftsmen
that section 1738 would ever be invoked, for example, to force a
federal court to give collateral-estoppel effect to a state court determination in these circumstances. 48
the application of collateral estoppel generally must be scrupulously observed in
this context of state prisoner § 1983 claims."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 369 (1977).
43 McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
1012 (1980).
44
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
4528 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
46 "[jludicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in

every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such state . . . from which they are taken." Id.
47
See, e.g., American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Section 1983 Developments, supra
note 3, at 1338 n.37.
At least one court has suggested that § 1738 does not require that collateralestoppel effect be given to state-court-determined facts in actions falling within
exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d
184, 189-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1334-35. Although § 1983 jurisdiction is concurrent, see,
e.g., Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 523, 531 P.2d 772, 775, 119 Cal. Rptr.
204, 207 (1975); Theis, supra note 20, at 860 n.10, it is likely that the draftsmen
of the statute foresaw that jurisdiction would, in practical effect, be exclusive,
because a litigant would be unlikely to risk challenging a state in its own courts.
But see Vestal, supra note 6, at 210.
48 The law of collateral estoppel was not well developed at the time. The
relevant part of § 1738 is based on the Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122,
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The most obvious application of section 1738 is to final judgments; to the extent that the state judgment itself is not collaterally
attacked or impeached, the justification for a broad interpretation
of section 1738 is that much weaker.49 In the McCurry paradigm,
no final judgment need be disturbed; the guilty verdict is not
directly attacked by a section 1983 action. Although inconsistent
adjudication may cause the state verdict to appear manifestly unjustifiable,5 0 this need not be the case. It could be maintained that
the result of the suppression hearing is a final judgment entitled to
"protection" under section 1738.51 But the state's interest in
preserving the integrity of this "judgment," often informally decided and not necessarily having any direct relevance to the guilt
of the defendant, is of an entirely different magnitude than the
state's interest in a final verdict. These considerations limiting the
application of section 1738 become even more compelling when
5 2
the federal-forum policy imbedded in section 1983 is considered.
Thus, section 1738 should not be interpreted broadly in this
context. Federal courts should not hide behind the cloak of section
1738 to avoid principled decisions concerning this difficult aspect
58
of federal-state relations.
and survives with only nominal changes. The mutuality requirement, which would
otherwise bar the use of collateral estoppel by the police-defendants in a McCurrytype suit, did not begin to erode until 1942. See note 28 supra. See also Section
1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1339 n.39.
49
See Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1338-39. Section 1738
might be best viewed as a broad way to prevent state actions from "indiscriminate
collateral attack" through the federal courts. See Averitt; supra note 16, at 203.
A narrow exception designed to facilitate actions under § 1983 would do little to
compromise this protection. Further, it is unclear whether a state court would
accord deference to its own findings if a § 1983 suit were brought before it. To
the extent that federal courts are unclear on this point, they should err on the
side of vindication of federal rights. See Averitt, supra note 16, at 203; Theis,
supra note 16, at 876.
50 This is particularly likely to be true when the constitutionality of a state
statute under which a criminal conviction was obtained is later challenged in federal
court. See, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
51
See note 19 supra.
5
2 See text accompanying notes 80-110 infra.
53
Compare Winters v. Lavine, 474 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1978) (unlike most
suits, preclusion in federal civil-rights suits is controlled by federal common law,
rather than by § 1738 and state law) and Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F.
Supp. 324, 336-37 (D. Vt. 1979) (rule giving collateral-estoppel effect to state
administrative fact finding is "not to be applied mechanically." Id. 337) with
Omernick v. LaBoucque, 406 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (W.D. Wis.) (Q1738 requires
federal court to apply state res-judicata rule in § 1983 suit), aFd mem., 539 F.2d
715 (7th Cir. 1976).
In a recent statement on collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court made no reference to § 1738 in concluding that, on the facts of that case, collateral estoppel
barred relitigation in federal court of a constitutional issue previously decided in
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B. Comity
Regardless of the relevance or outcome of the application of
section l738, a federal court could exercise its discretion and apply
the federal common law of collateral estoppel 5 4 to preclude relitigation of an issue previously litigated at the state level.5
Comity-"[t]he principle in accordance with which the courts of
one . . . jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference
and respect" 5 51-has special relevance in the federal system.
Comity finds its foremost expression in Younger v. Harris,57
in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts, as a discretionary matter, may not enjoin an ongoing state criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances. 58 Younger and its
progeny,59 however, are not directly applicable to the concerns of
state court. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). Of course, because
federal common law was sufficient to justify the preclusion, the case has no precedential value for the proposition that § 1738 has no applicability to collateral
estoppel.
For an excellent discussion of the applicability of § 1738 in § 1983 analysis,
see Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1331.
54 For centerpiece cases on the "federal common law of collateral estoppel,"
see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Cromwell v. County of Sac.,
94 U.S. 351 (1877).
55
Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1978).
56 BrcK's LAw DicToNARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
57401 U.S. 37 (1971).
58 Id. 53-54.

59 Younger and its progeny-the Younger-abstention cases--consider a series
of issues: (1) what constitutes interference, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at
43-53 (enjoining state proceeding); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971)
(declaratory judgment ordinarily has same practical effect as injunction). But see,
e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 431 (1979) (injunction to hold state pretrial
proceeding is not interference with state prosecution itself) (quoting Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975)). Cf. id. (although federal court may not
enjoin ongoing state custody proceeding, Court raised no objection to federal pretrial order placing children in parents' custody); (2) the type of state proceeding
with which interference is barred, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 434-35 (stateinitiated child-custody suit); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977)
(civil proceeding by state to recover fraudulently obtained welfare payments);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (civil-contempt proceeding in private
civil suit); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606-07 (1975) (nuisance proceeding against pornographic-movie theater); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53
(state criminal prosecution); and (3) when a federal court may not interfere, e.g.,
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (requiring dismissal of federal suit if
state proceedings commence "before any proceedings of substance on the merits
have taken place in federal court"). But see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 928-30 (1975) (federal court may enjoin threatened prosecution); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (federal court can declare unconstitutional
state law under which prosecution is threatened). See generally Comment, PostYounger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976
DuxE L.J. 523 [hereinafter cited as DuXE Comment].
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this Comment; their emphasis is clearly on interference with state
proceedings. Because a suit for damages under section 1983,
appropriately timed, 60 need not interfere with any ongoing or
imminent state proceeding, it would be a mistake to apply
mechanically the comity doctrine of Younger. "The issue of
whether federal courts should be able to interfere with ongoing
state proceedings is quite distinct and separate from the issue of
whether litigants are entitled to subsequent federal review of
state-court dispositions of federal questions." 61
Although federal case law accords the states some comity
interest in their determinations of federal constitutional issues,62
the scope of this interest is not certain. On the one hand, for
determinations implicating mostly federal law, the degree of deference due appears low. For example, federal questions are subject
to review and correction by the Supreme Court through direct or
certiorari review,6 3 and, occasionally, by the lower federal courts. 4
When federal courts have invoked comity, the protected interest has
tended to be the orderly administration of concurrent state proceedings, and not the integrity of the determination itself.65 In this
Despite the lack of ongoing state proceedings, Younger-type considerations
have been invoked as limits on the equitable powers of federal courts in civil-rights
cases. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976).
The proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act would restrict the Youngei
doctrine in § 1983 suits. See S. 1983, supra note 6, at § 2 (proposed 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983(c)(2), (e)(3)-(5)). See generally Mathias, supra note 6, at 815,993-94.
The breadth of the bill's proposed reforms demonstrates the extent of the
dissatisfaction with the Younger doctrine. The bill would: (1) overrule Moore v.
Sims, Trainer v. Hernandez, and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. by limiting Younger
abstention to criminal proceedings, see proposed § 1983(e) (5); (2) overrule Hicks
v. Miranda by allowing injunctions of state criminal proceedings commenced after
the § 1983 action was filed, see proposed § 1983(e) (4); (3) broaden the scope of
exceptions to Younger to allow enforcement of injunction of statutes that are in part
facially unconstitutional, compare proposed § 1983(e) (3) with Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. at 53-54 (federal court may enjoin enforcement of statute that is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it") (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941));
and (4) overrule Rizzo v. Goode by requiring broad injunctions against states and
municipalities to prevent recurrence of constitutional violations, see proposed
§ 1983(c) (2).
6

o See text accompanying notes 126-58 infra.
01 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 (1975).
62
See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979) ("Considerations of comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of issues in a
federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has chosen to litigate them in state
court.").
63 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
64
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) (habeas corpus).
05 See, e.g., Meadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d 345, 345 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (per
curiam) (abstaining, rather than dismissing, claims requiring exhaustion of state
post-conviction remedies), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). Accord, Meadows v.
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manner, states are given the opportunity to correct their own
constitutional errors, but once this opportunity has been taken, and
all appellate rights have been exhausted, the state-court determination of the federal question is open for review by the federal courts.
On the other hand, state-court determinations of historical
facts present different considerations. In this area, no court has any
special competence over any other; such findings are seldom reviewable on appeal to the Supreme Court and are subject to only limited
review in federal habeas-corpus proceedings. 6 A state court, thus,
has a considerably greater comity interest in its determinations of
fact than its rather minimal comity interest in the integrity of its
determinations of issues inextricably intertwined with federal law.
Aside from the differences in the importance of the comity
interest depending on whether the state-court determination is
grounded in historical fact or federal law, a state has a greater
comity interest to the extent that relitigation of an issue implicates
the integrity of a judgment. If, for example, the disputed issue is
the constitutionality of a state statute on which a criminal conviction rests, 6 7 the state comity interest is quite strong.

After all,

the conviction itself is subject to collateral attack only through the
extraordinary habeas-corpus remedy. Of course, there are many
issues the relitigation of which will not implicate the state judgment 6 3 and therefore this basis for comity depends on the nature
of the constitutional right violated.
The recent Supreme Court case of Montana v. United States,69
concerning the preclusive effect of a state-court determination on
a federal court, provides some insight on the proper scope of the
comity interest for issues implicating state-court judgments. The
Supreme Court held that, on the facts of Montana,7 0 "[c]onsideraGabriel, 563 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1977) (once plaintiff has exhausted state postconviction remedies, he may proceed with § 1983 suit).
66
See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1976).
6 7 See, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. City of N.Y., 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
68 Further, the analytic emphasis should be on the essential justice of the
verdict, not simply the existence of a but-for relation between the issue and the
final result. For example, in the case of a probable-cause hearing, it is insufcient
to find that had the judge decided the issue the other way, the evidence would
have been excluded and the conviction unobtainable. Rather, the soundness of the
verdict should be examined. See notes 165-74 infra & accompanying text.
69440 U.S. 147 (1979).
To In Montana, a private contractor brought suit in state court alleging the
federal unconstitutionality of a state taxing provision. The United States government directed and financed the litigation. The state supreme court held against
the plaintiff on all constitutional questions.
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tions of comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of
issues in a federal forum" 71 and hence full collateral-estoppel effect
was given. Montana involved a situation in which a reversal on the
issue sought to be estopped would have totally discredited a statecourt judgment. 72 There, the state's comity interest was significant,
even though the disputed issue was intimately tied to federal law.
No such strength of interest is necessarily present in McCurry-type
suits and thus comity need not be a determinative concern in that
context.73 Further, in Montana, unlike McCurry-type suits, the
federal plaintiff initiated the state litigation, choosing a state over
a federal forum. The Montana-type plaintiff thus has less reason
to override the state's comity interest.
There is an affirmative justification for giving little weight to
the state comity interest when a plaintiff is seeking damages from a
state official for the violation of his constitutional rights. An
official defending against a claim for damages is entitled to assert
at least a qualified immunity that significantly restricts his liability.74 The availability of such an immunity, which must be
Subsequently, the United States brought an action in federal district court
alleging similar constitutional infirmities. The question of the collateral-estoppel
effect of the state supreme court's prior judgment naturally arose. Id. 163. Although the government was not technically a party to the state action, the Court
found that its activity was sufficient to bind the United States to the results of the
proceeding. Id. 154-55, 154 n.5.
71 Id. 163.
72
0n a functional level, Montana verges infinitesimally close to a question of
res judicata-the only reason it was not analyzed as such an issue was because of
technical quibbles concerning the definition of a cause of action. Id. 154.
73This has not, however, been the attitude of the lower federal courts, which
have considered this aspect of comity-freedom from inconsistent federal-state
adjudications-to be a strong one. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848, 856 (1st Cir. 1978); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
74
See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22
See generally Note,
(1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
"Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 ComrsnN
L. lkv. 667 (1979); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496-508 (1978)
(qualified immunity for federal officials in actions directly under the Constitution).
Some officials, however, have the advantage of an even broader immunity.
A state governor and other executive officials enjoy a sliding-scale good-faith immunity that is widest for those having greatest responsibility and need for discretion.
See Scheuer v. Rthodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). In some circumstances,
prosecutors, judges, and legislators have an absolute immunity. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors in
initiating and presenting state's case, but breadth of immunity for administrative
and investigative acts left undecided); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 553-55 (judges
have absolute immunity for acts within judicial role); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 379 (1951). See also Butz v. Economou, 416 U.S. at 508-17 (in suits
directly under Constitution, federal officials enjoy broader than qualified immunity
if their state counterparts enjoy broader immunity in § 1983 actions).
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affirmatively pleaded by the defendant, 75 in effect imposes an additional requirement on the section 1983 plaintiff's cause of actionthe plaintiff must persuade or the defendant must fail to dissuade 76
the trier of fact that the defendant acted in bad faith or without any
77
reasonable basis for belief in the constitutionality of his acts.
Municipalities, however, have no good-faith defense. Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct 1398, 1409 (1980). See note 77 infra.
7
5 Although the qualified immunity is often spoken of as a defense, there has
been a split between circuits on the issue whether the burden of pleading the
immunity rested with the plaintiff or with the defendant. See Cruz v. Beto, 603
F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1979). Compare, e.g., id.1183-84 (burden of proof of
malice shifted to plaintiff when defendant is executive official claiming he has acted
in official capacity) with, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972) (burden of pleading the
good-faith defense lies with defendant). The Supreme Court has now resolved
this circuit split by holding that the defendant has at least the burden of affirmatively pleading his good faith. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S.Ct. 1920 (1980).
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the burden-of-persuasion issue, see
note 76 infra, it is clear that by putting good faith in issue, the bona fides of the
state or local government are questioned more than by litigating merely the question
of constitutionality. See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra.
76 Although the Supreme Court did resolve the burden-of-pleading issue, see
note 75 supra, Gomez did not reach the issue who bears the burden of persuasion
on the question of good faith. See Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1924 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J.,joining the opinion of the Court).
77 The qualfied-immunity defense has two parts-a "subjective" test and an
"objective" test. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). By failing either
test, the defendant loses his immunity.
Under the "subjective" leg, the defendant is liable if he acted "with 'malicious
intention' to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or cause him 'other
injury."' Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 566 (1978) (quoting Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322). Simple negligence is insufficient to pierce this part
of the veil of immunity; rather, it must be shown that the defendant either knowingly or purposefully caused the plaintiff harm. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
at 566; Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 173 (1979). The subjective test is a question of fact for the jury. See
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
Under the "objective" leg, the defendant is liable "if he knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the [plaintiff's] constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
at 322. What the plaintiff "should have known" is determined with respect to
"settled, undisputable law." Id. 321; accord, Procumier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at
565.
Although a city has no good-faith immunity, see Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409 (1980), the plaintiff's burden extends beyond showing
mere unconstitutional action by an official. Because the doctrine of respondeat
superior is not available to a § 1983 plaintiff, to recover damages from, or obtain
equitable relief against, a city, the plaintiff must prove that the official acted
pursuant to a city policy. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978). Mere failure to prevent unconstitutional conduct is insufficient. See
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976). Thus, to prevail against a municipality, the plaintiff must show that some official policy is unconstitutional. As
a result, the § 1983 plaintiff who sues a municipality, like the § 1983 plaintiff who
sues an official, attacks the bona fides of local government more than does a state
criminal defendant who merely raises a conventional constitutional defense. See
text accompanying notes 78 & 79 infra.

1980]
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To the extent that the section 1983 plaintiff is questioning the
bona fides of the state system more than is a criminal defendant, the
underlying assumption of comity-that the states may be equally
trusted as guardians of federal constitutional rights-is frontally
challenged.7 8 The very nature of a section 1983 damage suit casts
this premise of Younger into doubt; only an assumption of good
faith, thus begging the section 1983 question, could preserve the
theoretical underpinnings of Younger. 9 The logical reconciliation of the various interests is to leave the plaintiff to his admittedly
difficult proof.
C. Section 1983s Federal-Forum Policy
The argument for denying preclusive effect to a state-court
determination of a federal constitutional issue in the course of
criminal proceedings finds its strongest support in the theory that
section 1983 implies a preference for a federal over a state forum 8 0
The proposed Civil Eights Improvements Act would greatly increase the liability of cities. See S. 1983, supra note 6 (proposed §§ 1983(c)-(d)).
See
generally Mathias, supra note 6, at S15,992-93. The bill would: (1) overrule
Rizzo v. Goode by allowing injunctive relief against cities whenever an employee
violates constitutional rights, see proposed § 1983(c) (2); (2) modify Monroe v.
Pape and Rizzo v. Goode by allowing, in some circumstances, recovery of damages although an official acted contrary to city policy, see proposed § 1983(c) (1)
(B)-(D); and (3) reaffrm the holding of Owen v. City of independence that
cities have no good-faith immunity, see proposed § 1983(d) (1).
78 Of course, a McCurrj-type plaintiff is challenging the good faith of a police
officer and not that of a judge. It could be argued that police indifference to
constitutional rights does not bear on state court respect for these rights. Comity,
after all, emphasizes the judicial system, not the executive one. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). But local prejudices and passions may
well tend to interfere with the objectivity of even a well-meaning and competent
state judge. See note 85 infra & text accompanying notes 82-89 infra. Given a
possible overlap of institutional interests between the lower state courts and the
local police, see McCormack, supra note 16, at 276, 287, the better approach may
be to conduct the relevant inquiry in terms of the "system of criminal justice" as
a whole, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494; see id. 490-94, rather than to
consider the state judiciary in isolation.
79 See Averitt, supra note 16, at 201-02.
8
0 When referring to "federal forum," this Comment has in mind direct access to a federal district court, not merely the right of appeal or the right to
petition for certiorari from the highest state court directly to the Supreme Court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Although the contrary has been suggested, see
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 605 (1975), it is difficult to argue that
direct review by the Supreme Court fulfills any federal-forum policy that may
be found within § 1983. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964). Practical considerations dictate against any
meaningful federal review on appeal or certiorari. The large volume of cases in
the Supreme Court's docket necessarily results in a small chance that any single
litigant's petition for certiorari will be granted, see Averitt, supra note 16, at 193,
or that any appeal will receive more than a cursory review. Also, direct review
does not permit independent federal fact-finding, an often determinative element
in constitutional litigation. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. at 416-17; Averitt, supra note 16, at 193-94.
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for the litigation of federal constitutional claims.,- The legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act, passed when the federal government
was attempting to reassert its authority over the southern states,
makes it eminently clear that the sensitivities of the states were the
2
least of the draftsmen's concerns.
Drawing on this historical perspective, the Supreme Court
expressly articulated this federal-forum policy in Mitchum v.
Foster.8 The Court remarked that "[t]he very purpose of § 1983
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights." 84 Section 1983
was predicated on a positive mistrust of the states' capacity and
incentive to play their proper role in the federal constitutional
scheme, 5 and established "the role of the Federal Government as a
guarantor of basic federal rights against state power." 88 Thus,
Mitchum states explicitly that section 1983 implies a strong preference for federal court adjudication of federal constitutional claims.
Further, prior to Mitchum, in England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners,8 7 the Court had already modified the
classical model of res judicata to accommodate a section 1983
federal-forum policy by holding that a party forced to abstain from
litigating his federal claims in federal court while the state passes
81
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), held that the
presence of a federal forum was in no way dependent on the absence of a state
forum. Id. 183.
8s See id. 172-83.
83407 U.S. 225 (1972).
Mitchum held that § 1983 constituted an express
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. 243. The
Court was very careful, however, to leave intact its holding in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), that although § 1983 gave the federal courts the power to
enjoin state proceedings, considerations of equitable discretion may still preclude
them from so doing. 407 U.S. at 243.
84 Id. 242.
85 Id. 240-41. "The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot
be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage . . ...
CoNG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460
(1871) (remarks of Rep. Coburn), quoted in 407 U.S. at 421 n.31. See also
Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 1352, 1358
(1970).
86407 U.S. at 239. See also Theis, supra note 16, at 866-68 (making the
argument that "[i]f the Congress passed the legislation in question because it
feared that state courts gave only illusory protection to federal rights, it must not
have expected prior litigation in those state courts to have a preclusive effect on
the plaintiff when he later came to Federal court for protection." Id. 868.).
This argument is even stronger in cases such as McCurry's in which the defendant
has little choice but to litigate his claim in state court. See text accompanying
notes 94-97 infra.

87375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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judgment on his state claims has a right to return to federal court
to litigate his federal causes of action.8 This right is secured by
explicitly reserving the federal question for resolution by a federal
court; the right is waived only if the litigant "freely and without
reservation" submits his federal claims for decision to the state
court. 89

England involved a civil action for injunctive and declaratory
relief by a group of chiropractors challenging the validity of a
state licensing statute on procedural-due-process grounds. Forced
by the Pullman abstention doctrine 1o to seek relief first in the
state system, the plaintiffs returned to federal court after meeting
no success at the state level. The reservation mechanism of England
permitted avoidance of the normal application of the rules of res
judicata that would bar a plaintiff from relitigating both claims
that were previously litigated and claims that could have been
considered in a prior action, but were not.9' Considering the
inflexibility with which the res-judicata doctrine is traditionally
applied, England demonstrates some Supreme Court proclivity for
the guaranteed availability of a federal forum for the vindication
of federal constitutional claims.
There are fundamental objections to any conclusion
that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction
of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and
through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state
court's determination of those claims. Such a result would
be at war with the unqualified terms in which Congress
88 Id.

417.

89 Id. 419. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979), reaffirms the
England doctrine. The Second Circuit, in Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d
631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975), noted in 88 HAv. L.
Rv. 453 (1974), has extended England to cover a § 1983 case in which the
plaintiff was not forced to abstain and did not specifically reserve the federal
question in state court.
0 The Pullman abstention doctrine, named after Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a
federal constitutional claim in certain instances when a state court could resolve
the matter on state-law grounds. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. BEv. 1071
(1974).
The proposed Civil Rights Improvement Act would abrogate Pullman abstention in § 1983 actions, except for abstention while certifying a question to
the state supreme court. See S. 1983, supra note 6, at § 2 (proposed
§ 1983(e) (i) (c)).
91

See J. Moorm, supra note 19, at ff 0.405[3].
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. . . has conferred specific categories of jurisdiction upon
92
the federal courts ....

At the same time, England's holding barring the relitigation of any
constitutional claim freely pressed in the state proceeding 93 suggests
that no federal-forum policy within section 1983 is sufficiently overwhelming to negate the various res-judicata policies entirely.
Despite somewhat distinctive factual patterns, the England
result implies that a McCurry-type plaintiff should not be collaterally estopped, regardless of the particular constitutional claim
asserted. Such a plaintiff, of course, has actually litigated his claim
on the state level. But McGurry, and all other similarly situated
criminal defendants, did not "freely and without reservation" 91
press his claim. It is hardly realistic to expect a state criminal
defendant to forgo any opportunity to avoid conviction and
imprisonment in order to preserve a speculative possibility of
recovering damages. 95
It is true that England-with its primary focus on the
deleterious effect of the Pullman-abstention doctrine-could be
read narrowly as a comment only on abstention, and not as an
affirmative endorsement of a federal-forum policy. 96 But the spirit
of England dictates otherwise. If England is given the not unreasonable reading that it creates a right to a federal forum, then
that right has content only to the extent that injured individuals are
able to seek relief freely under it. If the position is adopted that a
state criminal defendant, under intolerable pressures to litigate any
constitutional claim at his state trial, has voluntarily waived his
right to a federal forum, the federal-forum right may be deprived
97
of all meaning.
92

England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. at 415

(footnote omitted).
93Id. 419. Accord, Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d at 636-37. See
also Theis, supra note 16, at 874-75. The England Court noted that "evidence

that a party has been compelled by the state courts to litigate his federal claims
there will of course preclude a finding that he has voluntarily done so." 375 U.S.
at 421 n.12. See note 95 infra.
94
England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. at 419.
95 One federal court has characterized this option as "a Hobson's choice"-no choice at all.

Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973).

See

also Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1340; ILL. Note, supra note 16,
at 97.
The dilemma becomes even more one-sided when one considers the risk of
being caught in a web of state procedural-bypass rules under which his failure to
litigate any claim may prevent him from obtaining state or federal habeas-corpus
relief. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
96 See Field, supra note 90, at 1078-79.
97
See Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), arfd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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The precise contours of this federal-forum policy have not yet
been defined. For example, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.98 implies
that the broad reading of England suggested above may be inaccurate. In Huffman, an adult-movie-house operator seeking a
section 1983 injunction against the enforcement of a quasi-criminal
state statute that would have closed his business 99 argued that the
ever-expanding Younger doctrine,100 mandating exhaustion of all
state appellate remedies prior to instigation of section 1983 litigation, was inapposite because of the absence of any civil analogue
to federal habeas corpus.1 1 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, rejected this argument on Younger-comity grounds stating:
[Plaintiff's] argument . . . apparently depends on the unarticulated major premise that every litigant who asserts
a federal claim is entitled to have it decided on the merits
by a federal, rather than a state, court. We need not
consider the validity of this premise in order to reject the
result which appellee seeks. Even assuming, arguendo,
that litigants are entitled to a federal forum for the resolution of all federal issues, that entitlement is most appropriately asserted by a state litigant when he seeks to
relitigate a federal issue adversely determined in completed state court proceedings. 1 2
Subsequent dictum erodes England's federal-forum policy:
We in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of
access to a federal forum for the disposition of all federal
issues, or that the normal rules of res judicata and judicial
estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court
10 3
proceedings.
A broad interpretation of this language suggests that the
Supreme Court is not inclined to open the federal courts to
McCurry-type plaintiffs. The dictum and holding together take
with one hand what is given with the other-if a litigant, after
exhausting all state remedies, is estopped from effectively asserting
a federal claim, whatever right of access to a federal forum exists
98420 U.S. 592 (1975).
99 Id.
0

'o

595-98.

See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
101 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 605.
102Id. 606 (emphasis in original).
103 Id. n.18.
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is basically meaningless. 10 4 Interpreted in this light, Huffman cuts
rather substantially into the spirit of England.10 5
Because Huffman involved a question of equitable restraint,
and not the issues of comity and preclusion, the precedential value
of this dictum is weak. More on point is Montana v. United
States,1 6 in which the plaintiff, attempting to avoid the effects of
collateral estoppel, had freely and voluntarily litigated his federal
claim in state court.10 7 Although the Supreme Court sustained the
application of collateral-estoppel doctrine on these facts, 08 the

Court also reaffirmed the doctrine's flexibility noting that there are
"special circumstances [that] warrant an exception to the normal
rules of preclusion." 109 The Court's explanation of one of these
exceptions renews the vitality of England. Apparently, collateral
estoppel would not be applied in a case that "implicate[d] the
right of a litigant who has 'properly invoked the jurisdiction of a
Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims,'
and who is then 'compelled, without his consent ....
to accept a
state court's determination of those claims.' "11
In sum, collateral estoppel is a technical, yet flexible, doctrine
whose application in any legal scenario depends on the various
policies discussed above. The independent policies favoring an
estoppel over and above its traditional justifications are weak.
Section 1738 provides a weak statutory basis on which to build a
system of preclusion jurisprudence. Notions of federal-state comity
are significant only when the integrity of a state judgment would
be undermined. Reference to comity is equally inappropriate when
the federal cause of action challenges the very foundation on which
the state judgment is based.
On the other hand, there is a substantial independent policy
rationale for relaxing the normal rigors of issue preclusion in
McCurry-type suits. Section 1983 evinces substantial concern,
possibly rising to the level of a right, with giving a litigant at least
104 See McCormack, supra note 16, at 273.
105 Justice Rehnquist also took a narrow view of the plaintiff's right to a

federal forum when the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged and the
state court has upheld the provision, relying on the right of direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 605. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976). In contrast, McCurry's challenge to the constitutionality of police behavior may only
reach the federal courts through a petition for certiorari, which is less than satisfactory. See note 80 supra.
10 440 U.S. 147 (1979). See notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
107 See text following note 73 supra.
108 See notes 70 & 71 supra & accompanying text.
109 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 155.
110 Id. 163.
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one chance to litigate any constitutional issue in federal court. A
wooden application of collateral estoppel would frustrate this right.
Thus, on balance, absent other considerations that may arise, collateral estoppel should not bar the relitigation of issues crucial to
a McCurry-type suit for damages, even if they have been previously
decided in a state criminal proceeding.
III. THE AvAmAmiLrry OF FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus

Final verification of the tentative conclusion just expressed must
await consideration of the argument implicit in McCurry v.
Allen I1 that the availability of federal habeas-corpus relief is sufficient to fulfill any federal-forum requirement of section 1983.112
The question is whether the availability of habeas for certain issues
should operate to bar some McCurry-type plaintiffs from relitigating
their constitutional claims.1 3 This Comment argues that the distinctions between the habeas-corpus remedy and section 1983 damages compel the conclusion that the availability of habeas corpus is
irrelevant to the issue whether a prior determination incident to a
state criminal proceeding should estop a section 1983 damage claim.
Prior to analyzing the habeas-availability criterion, a digression
is necessary to establish that, despite some intimations to the contrary, section 1983 plaintiffs asserting fourth-amendment claims
should not be in a disfavored position as a result of the nature of
their constitutional claim. Specifically, Stone v. Powell,"1 4 which
mandates unfavorable treatment for fourth-amendment habeas
claims, in no way denigrates the constitutional right itself. Stone
merely holds that the benefits of vindicating fourth-amendment
rights through habeas corpus are outweighed by the costs; the
incremental deterrence of illegal police behavior by means of this
tardy application of the exclusionary rule is not worth the price of
freedom for the guilty.l"
If we view Stone as a comment on the costs of the "remedy"
rather than a statement on the quality of the right, then a section
1983 proceeding should be embraced by a majority of the Court.
M 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
112 See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
113

McCurry, of course, is asserting a fourth-amendment claim for which habeas
review is not available. See note 13 supra. Application of this criterion, therefore, would save McCurry from being estopped.
114 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
115 Id. 493. It has been suggested that exposure to § 1983 liability would be
a greater deterrent to unconstitutional police behavior than the exclusionary rule.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); McCormack, supra note 16,
at 288.
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A section 1983 suit for damages is not nearly as intrusive as habeas
relief; because even the successful section 1983 litigant would not
gain early release from jail as a direct consequence of his suit, there
can be no claim that the federal courts are undoing the efforts of
the state criminal-justice system."16 Further, to the extent a federal
court is concerned with vindicating constitutional rights, a section
1983 proceeding is preferable to habeas corpus."17 The habeas
remedy-release from custody-bears no rational relationship to the
constitutional wrong committed, while a damage award under
section 1983 is theoretically tailored to the actual degree of harm.1 8
Thus, it is not inconsistent to treat fourth-amendment-based habeas
petitions unfavorably in relation to other constitutional claims and,
concurrently, accord the fourth amendment equal treatment within
the context of a section 1983 action.
Returning to the criterion of habeas availability as a determinant of the preclusive effect to be given a previous state
judgment in federal court, this Comment reasons that the federalforum policy of section 1983 compels the conclusion that the availability of habeas relief should never permanently prejudice a
McCurry-type section 1983 plaintiff. This conclusion can be
reached by analyzing both habeas corpus and section 1983 as
independent mechanisms designed to remedy constitutional wrongs.
But each mechanism's method of correction is different.
Section 1983 damages are designed to be compensatory, and,
where possible, should be based on common-law-tort principles." 9
1 6 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. Cf. text accompanying notes
45-53 supra (discussion on § 1738).
117 Habeas is primarily regarded as a means of terminating illegal restraint
and only secondarily as a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right. See
generally Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAv. L. REv.
1038, 1040 (1970).
8
"I The commonly stated principle of equity that a remedy should be closely
tailored to the magnitude of the wrong applies with equal force to constitutional
litigation. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978).
119 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), in which the Court stated:
In some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the
common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules of damages directly to the § 1983 action. . . . In other
cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not
also be protected by an analogous branch of the common law of torts....
In those cases, the task will be the more difficult one of adapting
common-law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries
caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.
Id. 258. The Court has maintained a neutral stance on the question of punitive
damages. Id. 257 n.11.
See also Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration
After Carey v. Piphns, 93 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hv.
Note].
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For example, the damage award to a state criminal defendant who
successfully argued that he suffered from police or prosecutorial
misconduct might include a measure of consequential loss such as
property or bodily injury and emotional suffering, 120 and perhaps
some compensation for the loss of the constitutional right itself. 1
Had the section 1983 plaintiff been unfairly incarcerated, the damage award might include recompense for such harms as lost
earnings. 122 In contrast, the habeas mechanism does not even
attempt to compensate for past sufferings; rather, the habeas
remedy begins where the section 1983 remedy leaves off. By
releasing a defendant from custody, habeas corpus can prevent
only future injury. 123 Thus, the habeas-corpus and section 1983
damage remedies do not overlap. They are mutually exclusive,
yet complementary, remedies that together operate to render the
injured party whole. Because they should not be interpreted simply
as alternative means of access to a federal forum, it is difficult to
see why the availability of habeas should preempt the applicability
of section

1983.124

IV. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Having demonstrated that habeas availability should not affect
the availability of section 1983 relief, this Comment now turns to
120 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 263-64 & n.22. See Htuv. Note, supra
note 119; Note, Section 1983: An Analysis of Damage Awards, 58 NEB. L. REv.
580, 590-94 (1979).
21
'
The Supreme Court in Carey rejected the idea that substantial damages
may be awarded for a procedural-due-process violation without proof of injury
distinct from the abridgement of the right itself. Carey, however, does not foreclose the award of such compensation for the violation of "substantive" rights.
See HiAv. Note, supra note 119, at 978-79. Cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d
1192, 1207 n.100 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,48 U.S.L.W. 3750 (U.S. May 20,
1980) (No. 79-880) (substantial damages available under a Bivens-type cause of
action for fourth-amendment violations).
122 This conclusion assumes that deprivation of the right can be said to have
"caused" the imprisonment. In cases involving, for example, an involuntary confession, causation would be relatively easy to prove. It is unlikely, however, given
the tenor of cases such as Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), that a fourthamendment violation would be considered the proximate cause of imprisonment
even if but-for causation was demonstrated. See Section 1983 Developments,
supra note 3, at 1352.
Fay v. Noia, 372
123Habeas corpus can also provide "belated liberation."
U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
124The reverse side of this argument is that when two modes of relief available in a single forum are duplicative, then the availability of one could rationally
be allowed to preclude the availability of the other assuming the existence of other
conflicting policies such as comity or repose.
Two Supreme Court decisions have, however, permitted joint access to forums
granting obviously supplementary remedies. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court dismissed the defendant's argument that an adequate state remedy should preclude relief under § 1983: "It is no answer that the
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its central question: how should the federal courts apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in section 1983 damage suits by state
criminal defendants?
This Comment begins with the premise that the broad implications of England-that section 1983 accords a right to a federal
forum that is not waived when a criminal defendant attempts to
assert a constitutional issue defensively at his state trial ' 25-are
correct. Because collateral estoppel would effectively frustrate this
policy, it should not be applied woodenly to broadly bar relitigation
of all constitutional claims. Although federal courts may, in some
cases, be compelled to preclude relitigation of certain issues, given
the strong federal-forum policy, this result must be justified by
resort to other consequential policy considerations.
There are, indeed, at least two reasons why free access to the
lower federal courts to litigate section 1983 claims previously
decided in a state criminal proceeding should be limited. The
first contrasting policy involves constraints imposed by companion
doctrines to habeas corpus; the second such policy concerns the
ability of society to tolerate inconsistent constitutional adjudications.
A. Companion Doctrines to Habeas Corpus
Although the court in McCurry v. Allen 126 was correct in
implying that the availability of habeas-corpus relief affects the
availability of section 1983 damage relief, that implication's validity
State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked." Id. 183. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Court held that access to the "forum" of union-management arbitration for relief from racial discrimination did not foreclose a suit for
damages in federal court under title VIL Id. 47 & n.7. Thus, at first glance, both
cases permit access to alternate forums according supplementary remedies.
On closer inspection, however, these holdings rest on the idea of inequality of
the respective forums in terms of the relief available. In Monroe, the comparison
was between state and federal-not two federal-forums; it was the sense of the
Court that the theoretical state remedy was not available in practice. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 174-80. In Alexander also, only one of the forums in question
was federal. Further, the Alexander plaintiff had received no relief at the hands
of an arbitrator. Had the nonfederal forums been in a position and of a disposition
to provide full relief for the federal wrong, both courts might have reached different
results. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 51 n.14.
Even acknowledging this analysis, both Monroe and Alexander can be read to
the effect that the existence of one forum providing a remedy distinct from the
remedy of another forum should not preempt the availability of the second forum.
Because the two cases permit joint access to forums providing duplicative remedies,
one would speculate that the courts would also permit joint access to forums offering
different forms of reief.
125 See text accompanying notes 87-97 supra.
126 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
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rests on a wholly different rationale than the one suggested in the
opinion. The availability of habeas is relevant only because of the
practical impact of the habeas-exhaustion requirement, and not
because of any theoretical arguments revolving around the federalforum policy.
No collateral-estoppel rule for section 1983 actions by prior
state criminal defendants should be permitted to undermine habeasexhaustion requirements. 2 7 Habeas exhaustion requires state
prisoners to pursue all state remedies before seeking federal relief.
This embodiment of comity policies' 28 has been scrupulously protected by the Supreme Court. For example, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 29 the Court held that granting injunctive relief under
section 1983 to force the restoration of a state prisoner's good-time
credits would not be an appropriate exercise of federal equity
powers. According to the Court, such a remedy would be tantamount to granting habeas, thus effectively circumventing the exhaustion requirement. 3 0
The Supreme Court subsequently stated that exhaustion is not
required for section 1983 damage actions despite the propriety of
delaying injunctive relief. 31 ' The Court apparently reasoned that
a suit for damages was not as destructive of the original state
judgment as injunctive relief. And there is some logic to this
position; an injunctive remedy is indistinguishable from habeas
corpus whereas monetary damages have an entirely different
effect. 132 But, as a practical matter, a fully litigated damage suit
would so effectively preordain the outcome of concurrent state
proceedings 133 that exhaustion would be a dead letter. Despite
this practical reality, it is not necessary to bar suit entirely by way
of collateral estoppel in order to preserve the exhaustion
requirement.
This distinction in exhaustion requirements based on the
nature of the remedy was put into sharp focus by two companion
'
'

27
28

See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) (1976).
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963).

129411

U.S. 475 (1973).

Id. 488-99. This holding was reaffied in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 554-55 (1974), but has been cast into doubt by a footnote in a more recent
case involving the Younger doctrine. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16
(1977).
1
'3 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 554-55. See also Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 494.
13 2 See notes 129 & 130 supra & accompanying text.
33
'
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 554 n.12 (noting that normal principles of res judicata would apply).
130
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cases in the Fifth Circuit. Both Fulford v. Klein 134 and Meadows
v. Evans 13 involved McCurry-type factual situations. Fulford attempted to sue various police and prosecutorial officials for section
1983 damages, alleging that certain exculpatory evidence was withheld at his trial.136 Similarly, Meadows attempted to sue on a claim
that his confession was involuntary. 37 The result was identical
in both cases-the federal court could not entertain the section 1983
claims until the plaintiffs had exhausted their respective state
38
remedies.
Given the state of Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time
these opinions were drafted,' 39 the Fifth Circuit, in effect, had to
rewrite the law to arrive at this conclusion. The court reasoned
that the availability of section 1983 relief was not keyed to the
form of the remedy, but rather to the nature of the underlying
claim; "where the basis of the claim goes to the constitutionality
of the state court conviction," 140 the Fifth Circuit would require
exhaustion. 14 ' The court grounded its decisions on the comity
policy, stating that if such suits were indiscriminately permitted,
"any concurrent state action would be an exercise in futility."'142
Judge Tjoflat, concurring in part in, and dissenting in part
from, the en banc affirmances of Fulford 143 and Meadows,1' would
have gone further. He would have dismissed both claims with
prejudice on the ground that the plaintiffs were collaterally
estopped from relitigating the constitutional issues decided against
them in the course of their respective state trials. 45 Judge Tjoflat's
134 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en bane, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam).
185 529 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en bane, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
'36 Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d at 378-79.
3.7 Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d at 386.
138 Id. 386; Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d at 382.
13 9 See text accompanying notes 131 & 132 supra.

140 Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d at 381.
14' See Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1253 (1st Cir. 1974). But see
Smallwood v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 587 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.
1978) (dictum); United States v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1977);
Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977).
142 Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d at 381.

The court went even further, declaring
that the suit by Fulford was "a thinly disguised circumvention of state remedies."
Id.
143 Fulford v. Klein, 550 F.2d at 344 (Tioflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Meadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d at 353 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
'45 Id.; Fulford v. Klein, 550 F.2d at 344 (Tjofiat, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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reliance on significant appellate authority in support of his position146 reflects his discomfort with the Supreme Court's apparent
discarding of the exhaustion requirement in section 1983 damage
Suits.

1 47

Neither the majority nor Judge Tjoflat explains precisely
why permitting the section 1983 damage suit to proceed would
circumvent state remedies or render the concurrent state action
futile. Neither opinion even attempts to explain away Monroe v.
Pape's 148 express statement that federal and state remedies could
149
harmoniously supplement each other.
The absence of any such analysis is even more surprising
given the rather obvious effects of a complete federal adjudication
on an ongoing state proceeding. First, the federal judgment could
have a collateral-estoppel effect on the state proceeding. This
preclusive effect is possible in either of two cases: (1) if the section
1983 plaintiff were suing the state jointly,' 50 in which case the
state would be a party and therefore bound by the decision; or
(2) if the state played a significant role in defending the suit, and
was thereby sufficiently connected with the litigation to be bound
by the result. 51 In either case, the federal litigation would intrude
unacceptably on the state proceeding, thus resulting in many of the
evils Younger and exhaustion were designed to cure.8 2 Second,
even in the absence of a technical estoppel, given the preeminence
of the federal courts in protecting federal constitutional rights, a
state court considering the same issue subsequent to the federal
determination would, as a practical matter, find it difficult to ignore
the federal holding and judge the claim de novo. Although the
state court might not be legally bound, 153 comity flowing from the
federal to the state system might compel the same result.
14GMeadows v. Evans, 550 F.2d at 350 n.19 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part).
'47 See text accompanying
148365 U.S. 167 (1961).

notes 131 & 132 supra.

See also note 124 supra.
3-0 Municipalities can be held liable in § 1983 actions. See Monel] v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
151 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 n.5 (1979).
152
This result is suggested by Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), a
-companion case to Younger, which held that declaratory relief is inappropriate in
those situations in which Younger precluded equitable relief. See notes 57-61
supra & accompanying text. One reason justifying the holding was the possible
collateral-estoppel effect on the concurrent state proceeding. Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. at 72. See also D=-n Comment, supra note 59, at 536-37 & n.55.
153 See Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Section
1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1347-48; D=nE Comment, supra note 59,
at 537 n.35.
149Id. 183.
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Thus, without some form of exhaustion requirement grafted
onto section 1983, a clash of comity policies results and the state
is deprived of the initial opportunity to correct their own constitutional errors. This friction is indefensible given the ease with
which exhaustion could be added to section 1983 jurisprudence by
delaying the federal action until all state remedies are exhausted.164
Of course, there is some cost to the plaintiff associated with
delaying the suit for damages. But the plaintiff's interest, when
balanced against the state interests in orderly proceedings embodied
in exhaustion requirements, is de minimis. Because the section
1983 plaintiff is receiving retrospective compensation for historical
harms, he should be relatively indifferent to the timing of his
monetary award.' 55
Judge Tjoflat's solution-granting collateral-estoppel effect to
state determinations of federal constitutional issues-suffers from
the simultaneous evils of over- and under-inclusiveness. On the
one hand, his uniform collateral-estoppel rule would sweep too
narrowly. Given the rather stringent conditions precedent for the
application of an estoppel,156 there may be cases in which the
state adjudication of the constitutional issue was insufficient to
warrant preclusion. Yet this technical failure bears no relevance
to the issue whether to apply classical exhaustion doctrine. On
the other hand, Judge Tjoflat's solution would also be overbroad.
Exhaustion requires one only to forbear, not to forgo. Further,
Judge Tjoflat's rule would also apply to state defendants found
innocent or to those who were found guilty but not imprisoned.
Current law imposes no exhaustion requirement on such section
1983 plaintiffs, and there is little reason why any such requirement
should be grafted onto existing doctrine.
Concern with reliance on what is basically equitable discretion to alter the availability of a legal remedy should not cause
the courts to thoughtlessly adopt an available legal doctrinecollateral estoppel-simply because its application approximates
the desired results. Broad statutes such as section 1983 are amenable to well-crafted judge-made qualifications designed to preserve
157
the integrity of other more specific statutes.
154 See part V(A) infra. But see S. 1983, supra note 6, at § 2(e) (2), expressly
rejecting an exhaustion requirement for § 1983.
155 An interest adjustment might adequately compensate for the economic

costs of delay. But see Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3, at 1354.
156 See notes 19-23 supra & accompanying text.
15 7 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973).
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Thus, the rule of the Fulford and Meadows majorities 5 8
appears to be better reasoned than Judge Tjoflat's proposal to
indiscriminately apply collateral-estoppel doctrine.
A second companion doctrine to habeas corpus potentially
restricting the availability of section 1983 damage relief is the
procedural-bypass rule of Wainwright v. Sykes.1 59 The scenario
implicated involves a state criminal defendant who fails, for whatever reason, to press his constitutional claim during his state trial,
as required by state procedures. Wainwright would totally foreclose federal habeas relief to such a defendant, absent a showing
of cause and prejudice. 6 0 Allowing a section 1983 plaintiff to
recover damages on these facts, though he would be blocked by
Wainwright from seeking habeas relief, permits him to recover in
damages what he could not recover by habeas-consequential dam161
ages for his "illegal" imprisonment.
Although the procedural-bypass policy was not a motivating
force, at least -bne court has concluded that a state criminal defendant should be collaterally estopped from relitigating any constitutional issues in federal court that could have been, but were
not, raised at his underlying criminal trial, "if there is reason to
believe that the failure to litigate the matter in fact was a recognition of the validity of the opposing claim." 162 To the extent that
procedural bypass might be a valid concern, this holding is too
harsh. The bar must be grounded in the theory that criminal
defendants will withhold defenses at state trials because section
1983 damages-litigated in an allegedly more favorable federal
forum-will fully compensate them for their illegal imprisonment.
But only an abstract-theoretical economist would argue that money
damages could ever adequately compensate a human being for
his illegal incarceration. 163 And even if one accepts the economist's
questionable position, the better rule would be to restrict the section 1983 damage award to exclude damages arising from imprison158 See text accompanying note 138 supra.
159433 U.S. 72 (1977).
1180 Id. 87. Before Wainwright, a defendant who did not take advantage of
available state remedies was foreclosed from seeking habeas relief only if the

defendant had "deliberately by-passed" state procedures at trial.
372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).

Fay v. Noia,

161 See note 122 supra & accompanying text. But see note 163 infra &
accompanying text.
162 See Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (footnote
This conflicts with traditional requirements for the application of
omitted).
collateral estoppel. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
16 3 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-402 (1963).
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ment,1 64 thus offering no economic incentive to a criminal defendant to forsake his constitutional remedies at the state level.
B. Limited Tolerance of Inconsistent ConstitutionalAdjudications
Although the grafting of an exhaustion requirement onto
section 1983 merely delays suit, there are some situations in which
the possibility of inconsistent adjudications in the state and federal
systems may necessitate complete federal abstinence. In these circumstances, collateral estoppel should be applied.
A victorious section 1983 plaintiff receives, at most, compensatory, and perhaps punitive, damages. 165 Assuming he lost the
same claim in state court, his continued imprisonment produces
an uncomfortable result-a man remains incarcerated because of
an error by a state judge and, despite a federal finding of unconstitutionality, does not necessarily have any method to escape what
is arguably an illegal imprisonment. Of course, some toleration
of inconsistent adjudications is necessary whenever collateral estoppel is eschewed, 16 6 but the involvement of constitutional liberties
and freedom from physical restraint transcends even the normally
potent policy considerations of res-judicata doctrine mitigating in
167
favor of consistency.
All constitutional rights, however, are not identical in this
respect. For example, continued incarceration even in the light
of a proven fourth-amendment violation can, if one accepts the
holding of Stone v. Powell,16 8 no longer be considered unjust.
Current fourth-amendment jurisprudence makes no link between
the validity of the fourth-amendment claim and the defendant's
guilt or innocence. 169 Thus, there is no fear that, by continuing
to detain the successful fourth-amendment section 1983 damage
70
litigant, society is unfairly incarcerating an innocent man.
16 4 Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver

Co.,

415 U.S.

36, 51 n.14

(1974)

(better to allow court to adjust remedy to prevent duplication of remedies than to
eliminate remedy altogether).
165 See notes 119-22 supra & accompanying text.
166 The Supreme Court has implied that the demands of federalism may in
fact raise society's tolerance for inconsistent adjudications. See Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975).
7
1 See generally note 25 supra.
168428 U.S. 465 (1976).
109 Id. 490, 492 n.31.

170 Further, the exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy that is incidental to
the right being protected. But see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HAnv.
L. REv. 945, 985-91 (1977).

The failure to apply the exclusionary rule does not

tarnish the constitutional right. In fact, Stone suggests that application of the rule
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An analogous result could not be tolerated, however, when
constitutional rights implicating the fairness of the trial itself are at
stake. For example, a criminal defendant alleging that his confession was coerced in violation of his fifth-amendment rights could
not be permitted to relitigate that issue in federal court because,
to the extent that the involuntariness of that confession casts the
state-court verdict into doubt, his possible innocence would make
his continued incarceration intolerable.
Society has provided a mechanism to create consistency in most
such cases-habeas corpus. But the proper procedure is to first
force the prisoner to seek habeas relief, if available. If the prisoner
prevails in the habeas proceeding, he may then proceed to sue
under section 1983 for monetary damages. Whatever collateralestoppel effect the original state determination had for the purposes
of section 1983 would have been removed by the federal rede71
termination of the constitutional issue in the habeas proceeding. 1
Despite the availability of habeas corpus to achieve consistency,
some types of cases may still produce inconsistent results if collateral-estoppel doctrine is not applied to section 1983 suits. First,
habeas relief may not be available because of a procedural default.1 72 Second, there may be a small class of constitutional claims

that could produce a damage award in an unbridled section 1983
suit yet be insufficient to permit habeas relief. This facially
anomalous result is theoretically possible because, in a habeas proceeding, the statutory power of the federal court to readjudicate
historical facts is severely restricted. 73 Given the importance of
such facts in constitutional cases,' 74 there may be cases in which a
section 1983 fact finder would find liability while a federal judge
hearing a habeas petition would not.
The arguments advanced in this Comment are potentially
disturbing. The implication of this line of analysis is that courts
must graft a collateral-estoppel doctrine of some form onto section
1983 not to do justice, but rather because society cannot tolerate
the appearance that the criminal-justice system has failed to proin the context of a fourth-amendment violation might be considered a "windfall"
to the criminal defendant with little deterrent effect on police conduct. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 490. Thus, a § 1983 action has the twin advantages of
denying a "windfall" to the defendant and allowing a court to fashion a remedy
consistent with the constitutional violation. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
171 See Section 1983 Developments, supra note 3 at 1330-54.
172
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
173 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
See note 80 supra.

174
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duce an equitable result for one particular defendant. But candor
is rather essential in this area. One necessary result of the various
restrictions on habeas relief-imposed to promote harmonious
federal-state relations-is the occasional unjust detention of some
state criminal defendants. Collateral estoppel simply allows society to rest a little easier with this result; it does nothing to change
or exacerbate it.
V. A PROPOSED ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING POLICIES
A. Some Guiding Principles
The various policies and analytic approaches discussed throughout this Comment suggest the form and limits of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel as applied to section 1983 damage suits.
* If the section 1983 plaintiff litigated and lost his constitutional claim in the course of his state trial, but was found not
guilty, there should be no bar to the immediate relitigation of the
constitutional issue in federal court. Because an inconsistent federal adjudication will not reflect on the propriety of the verdict,
the federalism concerns raised by the new determination are more
than offset by the vindication of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
* On the other hand, if the section 1983 plaintiff litigated
his constitutional claim before the state court, lost that claim,

and was found guilty, then the federal court must, at the very
least, abstain from entertaining the section 1983 suit until all state
forums for adjudicating the previously litigated constitutional claim
have been exhausted. Regardless of the availability of federal
habeas-corpus relief, relitigation of the constitutional claim in a
federal court before all state remedies are exhausted would impermissibly intrude on the course of the state litigation because of
the tendency to preordain the result.
After the section 1983 plaintiff has exhausted all state remedies,
the federal court may consider hearing the section 1983 dispute.
But a new inquiry is first required. Thus, the court must ask
whether, assuming the section 1983 litigant prevails, an inconsistent
adjudication can be tolerated. If so, the action may go forward;
if not, the plaintiff is at least temporarily barred from bringing the
suit.
Note that the relevant inquiry at this stage is not the availability of habeas relief. Of course, if habeas is available, the section 1983 plaintiff may first pursue that relief. If he prevails, then

the collateral-estoppel effect of the state adjudication is removed.
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If he is unsuccessful, then he is collaterally estopped from pursuing section 1983 relief by both a federal and a state determination.
. Somewhat different rules apply if the state criminal defendant did not litigate his federal-constitutional claims in state court.
If he was subsequently found guilty, then the procedural-bypass
rule of Wainwright v. Sykesl.7 5 suggests a limitation on his possible
recovery, though that rule should not bar his suit entirely. Of
course, if a not-guilty verdict was returned, there is no bar to suit
under any theory.
B. The PrinciplesApplied
This Comment's final task is to apply these principles to several
factual scenarios, in order to determine the outcome of this proposed test in a number of typical situations.
76
The first scenario examined is that of McCurry v. Allen.1

The McCurry fact pattern-involving a section 1983 suit alleging
fourth-amendment violations-presents an easy case. Because the
constitutionality of the search does not go to the question of
McCurry's guilt or innocence, the possibility of inconsistent adjudications is not troublesome and relitigation of the constitutional
issue decided against McCurry in the state suppression hearing
should ordinarily be permitted. At the time of McCurry's section
1983 suit, however, his appeal was pending in the state supreme
court. Thuis, the federal court must abstain from hearing
McCurry's constitutional claim until his state remedies have been
77

exhausted.1

Another scenario might involve an allegation of perjured police
testimony at trial, which would constitute a violation of the defendant's fourteenth-amendment right to a fair trial.178 A purely
technical application of collateral-estoppel doctrine would require
the court to go behind the jury's guilty verdict to determine
whether the police witness's credibility had been called into question. If not, then the "actually litigated" condition precedent to
the application of collateral estoppel would not be met. 1'7 9

The

court would also have to determine whether the jury must have
believed the witness in question in order to have reached the ver175 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See notes 159-61 supra & accompanying text.
176606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980).
'7 7 See id. 799.
178 See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Bdcci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 909 (1975).
179 See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
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dict it did. Cases may arise in which the court concludes that a
reasonable jury could have reached the verdict it did even if it
disbelieved the perjured testimony. 80 If that is indeed the case,
then the necessariness requirement of collateral estoppel would not
be satisfied, and no collateral-estoppel effect should be accorded to
the verdict. 81
This Comment's proposed tolerance-for-inconsistent-adjudication standard, however, would necessitate the application of collateral estoppel in all but the most extreme cases. Even if a reasonable jury could have reached the same verdict were the police
testimony not perjured, still, it might not have. Enough doubt
would therefore be cast on the verdict to prevent relitigation under
the inconsistent-adjudication standard. The section 1983 suit
should be permitted only if the court is convinced that the perjury
was harmless error. 8 2
It is true that, in the two factual scenarios just presented, the
McCurry test of looking at the availability of habeas would produce
the same results. 8 3 Under McCurry, the unavailability of habeas
relief to the prisoner claiming a fourth-amendment violation militates in favor of permitting the section 1983 action to go forward.
And because habeas would be available to the prisoner alleging the
use of perjured testimony, the section 1983 damage action should
be estopped. This symmetry should not be surprising because
tolerance for inconsistent adjudications-the lynchpin of this Comment's analytic approach-also helps shape judicial attitudes towards habeas availability. 8 4 But the temptation to rely on the less
cumbersome, per se test of habeas availability, on the assumption
that the results will mirror those of the inconsistent-adjudication
standard, must be resisted.
Instances in which the outcome of the two tests will differ are
easily imaginable. Cases may arise, for example, in which a state
prisoner would have a colorable habeas claim except for some procedural or tactical error in state court.' s In such a case, realizing
that it has no jurisdiction to hear the potential section 1983 plaintiff's habeas claim, the federal court may be tempted to give the
plaintiff "half a loaf" in the form of monetary damages under
180 See note 34 supra & accompanying text.

18 1 See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
82
1
See Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

18 a See McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d at 799.
184 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.30 (1976).
185 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); notes 159-61 supra &
accompanying text.
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section 1983. Such a result would be consistent with the habeasavailability test, but, with certain constitutional claims and the
proper factual circumstances, would simultaneously clash with the
inconsistent-adjudication standard.8 6
Of course, McCurry's habeas-availability test could be modified to repair this inconsistency by adding an analysis whether
the federal court could have entertained a habeas petition but

for the defendant's procedural default. Even with this modification, however, there are scenarios in which the two tests would
yield substantively different results. One example would involve a
fifth-amendment claim arising from a subpoena of an individual's
personal papers. The state criminal defendant could have been
rebuffed in his attempt to quash the subpoena in state court, refused an injunction in federal court on Younger grounds, 87 submitted to the subpoena on pain of contempt, and been convicted
and imprisoned. 8
Although the circumstances in which a subpoena of personal
papers constitutes a fifth-amendment violation are narrow, 8 9 such
cases do arise.190 Despite the rather substantial possibilities of
significant reputational injury from this constitutional violation, 191
the habeas-availability test, even as modified above, results in the
application of an estoppel to the section 1983 damage action. Under
the proposed test, however, the result would be different. As is
186 A similar situation would arise if the defendant had been found guilty in

the state criminal trial but was only fined. Habeas is clearly foreclosed to him.
See generally 28 U.S.C. 2254 (1976). Under the habeas-availability test, therefore, a § 1983 suit would be permitted. But there might be a societal problem in
permitting the inconsistent adjudication, so under this Comment's proposed test, the
§ 1983 suit would be estopped.
87
'
See notes 57-68 supra & accompanying text.
8
8 Cf. Sreter v. Hynes, 419 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiff barred
by collateral estoppel from relitigating constitutionality of subpoena duces tecum
in a § 1983 injunctive action seeking to quash the subpoena).
189 The situations in which such a subpoena of private papers would constitute
self-incrimination is not clear. The papers in question would have to be clearly
personal, see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974); business papers and
tax records, two frequently litigated examples, are not generally protected. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976).
9
' o See United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 890 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977) (patient medical records); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d
329 (2d Cir. 1976) (letters to personal accountant); In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp.
37 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (tape recordings of personal telephone conversations).
191 See, e.g., State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(evidence to the effect that the defendant Tsavaris and one Miss Burton had. been
engaged in a stormy love affair; that Miss Burton had become pregnant; and that
Dr. Tsavaris had compelled her to undergo an abortion despite her unwillingness,
to do so).
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true in McCurry, the constitutionality of the subpoena does not
go to the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Thus,
an inconsistent adjudication could be tolerated. Under this Comment's proposed test, therefore, the section 1983 suit should be
permitted to proceed.
CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it is apparent that the question presented in
McCurry transcends the technical aspects of collateral estoppel.
The case is actually one in a line of federal cases seeking to determine the proper place for section 1983 in the landscape of constitutional adjudication. This Comment has suggested a possible
test for determining when a section 1983 suit for damages raising
issues previously litigated in a state criminal proceeding could be
heard by a federal court. Although the results under the proposed
method of analysis may often be identical with the results achieved
under the McCurry habeas-availability test, there are cases in which
the result would be entirely different. In any event, it is submitted
that this Comment's proposed test rests on stronger theoretical
underpinnings.

